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ARTICLES
THE REGULATION OF HATE SPEECH BY
ACADEME vs. THE IDEA OF A
UNIVERSITY: A CLASSIC OXYMORON?*
JOSEPH W. BELLACOSA**
Legend has it that Willie Sutton, when asked why he robbed
banks, answered, "Because that's where the money is!" One hopes
that when people are asked, "Why do you go to college?", their
response might be: "Because that's where the education is." Such
an answer reflects the traditional idea of a university, embodying
the seemingly self-evident proposition that it is the universe in
which ideas are freely discussed and shared. However, clouds of
doubt concerning this traditional idea have cast some shadows
across the landscape of academe in the form of a recent phenome-
non-the regulation of hate speech. By hate speech I refer here to
the distribution and utterance on college campuses of bigoted, ra-
cist, sexist, religious and similar shibboleths. The perceived threat
of hate speech has propelled institutions of higher learning towards
* This essay is adapted from a speech delivered by Hon. Joseph W. Bellacosa, New
York Court of Appeals, at the annual dinner of the Hudson Mohawk Association of Colleges
and Universities at Albany, New York, on May 28, 1992. Excerpts of this speech appeared in
The New York Law Journal on June 24, 1992.
** Judge, New York State Court of Appeals.
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a reactive regulation of open, robust, cantankerous, contentious,
and often vile and hurtful discourse and exchange of occasionally
tormenting ideas and epithets. The scholastic sanctuaries seem to
be yawing, swaying, and overreacting to the ugly profusion of hate
speech.'
My personal sense is that the attempt by academe to regulate
such speech in this fashion may be unconstitutional. While a nar-
rowly drafted regulation may qualify under some bare exceptional
circumstances and analysis, it is in any event counterproductive,
rife with frustration, and unwise. In a phrase, it is a classically ox-
ymoronic enterprise. This characterization is particularly apt if the
usual modes of bureaucratic, administrative, or even scholastic reg-
ulation are employed. In the short run, my conclusion is buttressed
by the controversy and litigation that has erupted around these
hate speech codes. They are going nowhere fast.2 In the long run,
these exertions on campuses across the country are doomed by
self-contradiction. They clash head-on with the educational envi-
ronment of free discourse, openness, and re-exploration of ideas,
even detestable or very unsettling ideas.
Woodrow Wilson, while president of Princeton University, ob-
served: "I have always been among those who believed that the
freedom of speech was the greatest safety, because if [people are]
fools, the best thing to do is to encourage [them] to advertise that
fact by speaking."' Some eighty years later, Benno Schmidt, then
president of Yale, echoed Wilson's trenchant challenge amidst the
current turmoil. Bucking prevalent academic philosophies,
Schmidt, a First Amendment scholar in his own right, opined:
Much expression that is free may deserve our contempt. We may
well be moved to exercise our own freedom to counter it or to
See Todd Ackerman, Decision Could Kill College Speech Codes, Hous. CHRON., June
28, 1992, at Al (citing estimates that at least 250 universities have some type of general or
specific code); Ken Emerson, Only Correct-A Campus Report: Wisconsin; New Race Rela-
tion Rules on College Campuses, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 1991, at 18 (estimating that nearly
125 colleges and universities have promulgated codes prohibiting hate speech in one form or
another). See generally Rodney A. Smolla, Academic Freedom, Hate Speech, and the Idea
of a University, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 195 n.1 (1990) (citing articles concerning
the debate over hate speech on college campuses).
2 See University of Wis. at Madison Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163,
1181 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (striking university rule as overbroad and vague); Doe v. University of
Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 866-67 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding university policy on discrimina-
tion and harassment vague and overbroad); infra notes 28-35 and accompanying text.
Barbara Dority, Civil Liberties Watch: The P.C. Speech Police, THE HUMANIST, Mar./
Apr. 1992, at 31.
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ignore it. But universities cannot censor or suppress speech, no
matter how obnoxious in content, without violating their justifica-
tion for existence.... On some other campuses in this country,
values of civility and community have been offered by some as
paramount values of the university, even to the extent of super-
seding freedom of expression. Such a view is wrong in principle
and, if extended, is disastrous to freedom of thought .... The
chilling effects on speech of the vagueness and open-ended nature
of many universities' prohibitions ...are compounded by the
fact that these codes are typically enforced by faculty and stu-
dents who commonly assert that vague notions of community are
more important to the academy than freedom of thought and ex-
pression .... "
These two academic leaders span the twentieth century Amer-
ican experience and provide illuminating perspectives for examin-
ing the solution being proffered for the problem of an apparently
enveloping tide of ethnoviolence. In my frame of reference, hate
speech should be treated differently from hate-filled conduct. Not
surprisingly, these horrid verbal manifestations on college cam-
puses mirror similar effusions in broader society, in crumbling ur-
ban centers, and even in the "safe havens" of suburbia and
academe.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was once asked, "What is it
like up there in the Supreme Court?" He responded, "We are very
quiet there," and, after a pause, added "but it is the quiet of a
storm centre."6 Academic and judicial sanctuaries may be very
much alike in the framework of his telling metaphor.
The faddish response of many colleges and universities, both
public and private, seems to be the adoption of disciplinary hate
speech codes, or the modification of existing student conduct codes
to encompass hate speech. These efforts, for the most part, seem
well-intended as they focus on the fulfillment of a school's respon-
sibility to provide full and equal opportunity, to meet equal pro-
tection obligations and commitments, and to redress a cross-sec-
tion of harms inflicted on a variety of victims. But these well-
4 Nat Hentoff, 'Speech Codes' on the Campus and Problems of Free Speech, DISSENT,
Fall 1991, at 549.
5 See, e.g., Alexander Cockburn, Beat the Devil, THE NATION, May 27, 1991, at 690
(discussing expulsion of Brown University student for violating hate speech policy); Tom
Morgonthau et al., Race on Campus: Failing the Test, NEWSWEEK, May 6, 1991, at 26 (re-
counting bias incident at Yale University).
6 Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 292 (1920).
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intended efforts are also too often disguised missions, driven by
political and special interest agendas.
My two focal points are the legality and the wisdom of the
proliferation of hate speech code exertions. A threshold problem
or, at least, concern must be with organic law-the First Amend-
ment. New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis reflected a point
of view recently in his book Make No Law,7 marking the twenty-
fifth anniversary of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan," that the
words of the Bill of Rights are simple and unqualified: "Congress
shall make no law . . .abridging the freedom of speech .... ,,
Nevertheless, voluminous litigation and scholarly writings continue
to challenge the seemingly plain principle.
As an almost universal proposition, colleges and universities,
serving as state actors or agents, cannot regulate speech based on
its content. If the speech falls into some very exceptional and
highly qualified categories, such as fighting words,10 obscenity," or
defamation, 12 there may be some room for regulation. These excep-
I ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1991).
8 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
U.S. CONST. amend. I; see LEWIS, supra note 7, at 47.
10 Fighting words are those "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to in-
cite an immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942). In Chaplinsky, petitioner was convicted for violating a New Hampshire statute
prohibiting anyone to address "any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person
... with intent to deride, offend or annoy him." Id. at 569. The violation was based upon
petitioner's statements during a public disturbance that the city marshall was a "God
damned racketeer" and a "damned Fascist." Id. Because such utterances were not an essen-
tial element of the free exchange of ideas or the discovery of truth, the Supreme Court
found that any benefit derived from them was clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality. Id. at 572.
" Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Obscene material is not simply that which
depicts sexual acts, but rather that which an average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards, would find, when taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interest. Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). To be considered obscene, the material must also
depict, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined under state law, and
lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value when taken as a whole. Miller, 413
U.S. at 24.
2 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The burden of proving whether
a defendant has forfeited First Amendment protection through the publication of false and
defamatory statements depends upon the nature of the publication and the status of the
parties involved. In New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that a public
official may not recover damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct
absent a showing of "actual malice"-that the statement was made with knowledge that it
was false 6r with reckless disregard for whether it was false or not. Id. at 279-80; see also
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (extending New York Times rule to "anything
which might touch on an official's fitness for office," even if the defamatory statement did
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tional utterances are deemed to enjoy such little redeeming social
value and to be so undeserving of constitutional protection that
any negative consequences of interdicting them are outweighed by
a perceived need for deference to competing societal benefits and
protections.
The spectrum of differentiation, however, is very difficult to
pinpoint and define with any precision. Hate speech can be
mercurial and terribly provocative. It is often personalized and vi-
cious and it can be permanently harmful."3 Therefore, society
tends to view it differently in nature from utterances that courts
have classified as political in nature, which enjoy the highest and
purest hierarchical rank of protection.1 4
Where then does the modern plague of hate speech on cam-
puses fit into First Amendment jurisprudence and principles? One
Supreme Court case of doubtful sweep arguably suggests that hate
speech may be constitutionally regulated when it substantially in-
terferes with the educational process and opportunity to learn.15
Thus, a narrowly drafted policy-for example, one that punishes
only racial or sexist epithets intentionally directed at an individ-
ual, as opposed to pure ideas exchanged in the classroom-may
pass constitutional muster. The targeted individual in such a case
is not able to turn a deaf ear and, thus, suffers an unavoidable
injurious interruption or inflammatory disruption of the central
educational experience and atmosphere. By this reasoning, provo-
not concern official conduct). The Court later addressed the question of a private plaintiff
involved in an issue of public concern and found the New York Times standard inapplica-
ble. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974). The Court held that so long as
there is no liability without fault, states may define for themselves the appropriate standard
of liability in these situations. Id. at 347.
13 See Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 457-76 (discussing injuries inflicted by racist speech); Mari
J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L,
REv. 2320, 2326-41 (1988) (reviewing the victim's story of the effects of hate filled messages).
N See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2564, 2567-68 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); see also infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
15 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). In Healy, a state college denied official recogni-
tion to a group of students who wished to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society ("SDS"). Id. at 170. The college based its denial on the fact that the chapter had
links with the national SDS, which was known for promoting "disruption and violence" on
campuses and whose philosophy was "antithetical to the school's policies." Id. at 174-75.
Although the Court held that the denial of recognition violated the local SDS chapter's First
Amendment rights, it suggested that the school may deny recognition to the group if it
refused to abide by reasonable campus rules and regulations governing conduct. Id. at 191-
94.
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cations short of fighting words may be curtailed. However, this ex-
ception, even if formerly valid, may have fizzled.
Recently, in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,16 the United States
Supreme Court, rather than explicitly endorsing such a chilling re-
straint in the educational context, seems to have promulgated its
own chilling counter-guidance to speech regulations when it upheld
a First Amendment challenge to a hate crime municipal ordinance
in St. Paul, Minnesota."7 The ordinance in question penalized plac-
ing on "public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti ... which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender."' 8 The Court de-
clared the ordinance facially invalid under the First Amendment
because its prohibitions were based solely on subject matter, i.e.,
certain "disfavored" topics. 19 Although the Minnesota Supreme
Court narrowly construed the ordinance to prohibit only those dis-
plays or symbols that amounted to "fighting words," the Supreme
Court found that the prohibition was, in functional impact,
targeted at the disfavored topics specified in the ordinance.20 Dis-
plays or symbols constituting fighting words, expressing hostility to
topics other than those listed in the ordinance, were unaffected.2
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the ordinance amounted
to impermissibly content-based discrimination and was therefore
invalid.22
Moreover, the Supreme Court also concluded that the ordi-
nance amounted to viewpoint discrimination because those arguing
in favor of racial or religious tolerance, for example, could project
"fighting words," addressed to something other than "race, creed,
color, religion, or gender," to advance their cause while their oppo-
16 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). In R.A. V., petitioner was charged for violation of the St. Paul
Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance after he allegedly burned a cross inside the fenced yard of
a black family. Id. at 2541.
'1 Id. at 2550. See generally Speech Therapy: First Amendment Decision on 'Fighting
Words,' THE NEw REPUBLIC, July 13, 1992, at 7 (asserting that R.A.V. decision declared
"unequivocally that even racist.and sexist speech is protected by the First Amendment").
18 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541; see also David Savage, Hate Crime Law is Struck Down,
L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1992, at Al (noting that 46 states have measures outlawing burning of
crosses and displaying of Nazi emblems and other signs that convey bias and hatred).
" R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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nents could not.2 3 Condemning the particular activity and recog-
nizing that municipalities have a compelling interest in ensuring
"basic human rights of members of groups that have historically
been subjected to discrimination," the Supreme Court nevertheless
concluded that the content discrimination in the St. Paul ordi-
nance was not reasonably necessary to achieve that interest.24
As some colleges and universities wrestle with the problem of
hate speech, they too have framed hate speech codes that have
tried to fit within the well-known fighting words concept. That
doctrine, enunciated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,25 focuses
on words that intentionally tend to incite immediate breaches of
the peace.26 Institutions and regions, progressive by reputation and
practice, strained to squeeze restrictive rules into this narrow tube,
but it is highly doubtful in view of R.A. V. that this narrow doctrine
will tolerate such experiments. Indeed, as punctuated by the Court
in R.A.V., the fighting words doctrine allows regulation as to the
mode, not the content of the expression.
In 1989, for example, the University of Wisconsin adopted a
rule authorizing discipline for racist or discriminatory behavior di-
rected at an individual that was intentional and demeaning and
created a hostile environment." This regulation was struck down
by a federal district court as overbroad. 2e The court found that the
rule covered situations in which no breach of the peace was likely
and, therefore, did not meet the requirements of the "fighting
words" doctrine. Subsequently, the University modified its ban to
cover only situations involving direct confrontations between stu-
21 Id. at 2547-48.
2, Id. at 2549-50.
25 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
21 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572; see supra note 10.
2 R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545.
28 See University of Wis. at Madison Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163
(E.D. Wis. 1991). The University of Wisconsin Rule provided in pertinent part that the
university may discipline a student:
(2)(a) For racist or discriminatory comments, epithets or other expressive behav-
ior directed at an individual or on separate occasions at different individuals, or
for physical conduct, if such comments, epithets or other behavior or physical con-
duct intentionally: (1) demean the race, sex, religion, color, creed, disability, sex-
ual orientation, national origin, ancestry or age of the individual or individuals;
and (2) create an intimidating, hostile or demeaning environment for education,
university-related work, or other university-authorized activity.
Id. at 1165.
21 Id. at 1173.
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dents.3" Still concerned about its constitutionality, and wary of the
legal costs of defending the rule, the University reassessed its rule
and repealed it in the wake of R.A."V. s Since the narrow "fighting
words" channel seems even more constricted than ever, it appears
to offer little promise for those who seek to use it to calm the pre-
sent academic turbulence through greater restriction of speech.
Another policy, adopted in 1988 by the University of Michi-
gan, regulated behavior in classroom buildings, libraries, labs, and
recreational and study centers. The policy subjected students to
disciplinary action for verbal or physical behavior that "stigma-
tize[d] or victimize[d]" an individual based on race, sex, or other
grounds, and either threatened that individual's academic efforts,
employment, extracurricular activities, or safety, or had the pur-
pose or effect of interfering with the same, or created an intimidat-
ing, hostile, or demeaning environment for the same.32 Again, the
effort was swamped in the whirlpool of unconstitutional over-
breadth and vagueness.3" The lower federal court addressing the
policy not only ruled that words like "stigmatize," "victimize,"
"threat," and "interfere" were so vague that enforcement of the
rule would violate due process, but also expressed a concern over
the omission of an exemption for classroom discussion. 34
Apart from the concerns over constitutionality, equally serious
concerns flare up regarding the wisdom of such codes. Assuming
constitutionality, the cost, prudentially, must be weighed and it
may be exorbitant. These regulatory adventures in an academic at-
mosphere loom disproportionately to the threatened harms. They
also seem contradictory to the raison d'tre of institutions of
higher learning that dare to experiment with their adoption and
enforcement. 35
30 University of Wisconsin Repeals Ban on Hate Speech, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1992,
at A10.
3I Id.
31 See Doe v. University of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 852-56 (E.D. Mich. 1989). Sanc-
tions under the university's policy ranged from mandatory attendance in special classes to
expulsion. Id. at 857.
11 Id. at 866-67; see also First Amendment-Racist and Sexist Expression on Cam-
pus-Court Strikes Down University Limits on Hate Speech-Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 103
HARV. L. REV. 1397, 1397-98 (1990).
3' Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 866-67.
35 As the court in Doe aptly described, the principle of freedom of speech "acquire[s] a
special significance in the university setting, where the free and unfettered interplay of com-
peting views is essential to the institution's educational mission." Id. at 863; see also Keyn-
ishion v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (emphasizing commitment to safe-
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In the kindest light, these codes are supposed to foster a more
tolerant, civilized, peaceful, and effective learning environment.
However paternalistic they may be in some respects, they never-
theless represent a laudable set of goals. The rub comes from the
backfire and chill on skeptical speech and the free exchange of
ideas. Even the chameleonic mantra "political correctness" rears
its disconcerting head to further complicate and misdirect the ef-
fort to weigh the wisdom of such regulatory exertions.
Few people could responsibly deny that the "reform" hate
speech codes can be used as vehicles to foster special interests and
ideological or political agendas. That truth makes these codes po-
tentially susceptible to great abuse and mischief. To the extent one
knows or suspects that special interests lurk beneath seemingly be-
nign motivations, a legitimate concern about the consequences
emerges. Imagine the specter of a Trojan horse-we'll call it "Oxy-
moron"-wending its tricky entry and incursion into the citadel of
academe. Imagine further the belated, loud lament of the surprised
populace after the trap is sprung: "Where has all the freedom of
thought and expression gone?" Historians would be quick to re-
monstrate that those who neglected the painful lessons of history
about regimes that suppress or regulate speech are doomed to re-
live the pain.
Thus, from my perspective, these speech-regulating codes
seem already well onto the slippery slope that drops only downhill.
They are contrary to the rich and great traditions of higher educa-
tion-open discourse, lofty or even lowly debate, and classical rhet-
oric. In The Idea of a University,36 mid-nineteenth century author
John Henry Cardinal Newman provided this illuminating
description:
[A] University is not a birthplace of poets or of immortal authors,
of founders of schools, leaders of colonies, or conquerors of na-
tions. It does not promise a generation of Aristotles or Newtons,
of Napoleons or Washingtons, of Raphaels or Shakespeares,
though such miracles of nature it has before now contained within
its precincts. Nor is it content on the other hand with forming the
critic or the experimentalist, the economist or the engineer,
though such too it includes within its scope. But a University
training is the great ordinary means to a great but ordinary end;
it aims at raising the intellectual tone of society, at cultivating the
guarding academic freedom).
31 J.H.C. NEWMAN, THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY (1947).
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public mind, at purifying the national taste, at supplying true
principles to popular enthusiasm and fixed aims to popular aspi-
ration, at giving enlargement and sobriety to the ideas of the age,
at facilitating the exercise of political power, and refining the in-
tercourse of private life."
The rich history and tradition of classical rhetoric-an intel-
lectual discipline which originated perhaps 150 years before Aris-
totle-were refined by Aristotle. In that ancient framework, he and
his school provided the foundation for many important features of
modern Western education.3 8 While rhetoric as such-the formal
study and discipline-has undergone considerable change since
Greco-Roman times (along with the modern connotative decon-
struction of the rich word), the school campus is still admired as
the unique and special forum for freely exchanging ideas and train-
ing the human mind. The central purposes of higher education
persist: to expose students to a diversity of new ideas and people
and to teach critical examination of the opinions and perspectives
of others rather than blind acceptance or rejection based on direc-
tion from an oligarchy of omniscenti.
Regulatory speech codes, for whatever doubtful good they may
be intended to accomplish, also have a highly toxic side effect.
They hermetically seal and carbonically date formative minds in
the then-current state of knowledge and of fallible majoritarian
viewpoints. They preclude by fiat the ever-evolving reconsidera-
tion, reevaluation, and challenge to status quo thinking and knowl-
edge. What a sad specter it would be to see educational leaders,
administrators, faculty, and students cautiously tip-toeing around
their campuses and classrooms, and one another, avoiding engage-
ment with respect to controversial or unpopular viewpoints or the-
ories! This image should be repugnant to anyone who values a vi-
brant, dynamic educational heritage, tradition, and experience.
When divergent theories and viewpoints are restricted, suppressed,
or, worst of all, punished in and by academe, then not only do the
institutions of higher learning stagnate, but society itself also suf-
fers an infrastructural atrophy and deterioration.
Yet, schools and-society at large wince with a felt need to draw
some lines of interdiction, the transgression of which produces
some kind of sanction. They want teeth behind the shout from the
17 Id. at 146-47.
" See DONALD L. CLARK, RHETORIC IN GRECO-ROMAN EDUCATION 24-50 (1957).
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lips to "Be still." To be sure, people abhor conformity while they
yearn for civility. The key may be found in a quenchless desire for
alternative means to achieve the good ends-tolerance, mutual re-
spect and a healthy, effective environment conducive to learning
and discourse-without sacrificing fundamental values or produc-
ing undesirable consequences. It is often forgotten that the ulti-
mate lesson of King Solomon's wisdom resulted from the avoid-
ance of having to split the baby in half.
Regrettably, society has learned to like and expect quick,
short-term fixes. The nation and world seem fixated by instant
perception, immediate reaction, and prompt solution. Thought, re-
flection, and deliberation are brushed aside and impatiently dis-
counted and, thus, discouraged. Today, people experience wars, so-
cietal upheavals, and natural disasters through a voyeuristic couch-
potato lens, as though flicking a remote control solves problems by
just moving them off the screen. Yet solutions proportionate to big
problems, such as hate speech, require time, reflection, and careful
thought; they do not emerge whole from shoot-from-the-hip or
knee-jerk fixes.
However audacious it may be for me as a judicial officer to
propose academic solutions to academicians, I nevertheless do so,
with the caveat and understanding that the suggestions are not
particularly original or clever. Nor should anyone expect that any
one of these ideas alone will do the job. Educational leaders may
gain some insights, however, by seriously weighing the following
steps:
1. Utilize and enforce existing academic codes governing stu-
dent conduct, concentrating especially, for example, on those edu-
cating about and prohibiting alcohol and drug abuse, probably the
worst breeder of hate speech incidents on college campuses or any-
where else on this planet.
2. Identify and promote profiles in tolerance and courage.
First and foremost, teachers, already heroes and heroines in these
respects should be exalted, honored, respected, and encouraged
very regularly and very visibly. This approach may help counter
the lionizing of haters and disrupters, those few who are driving
institutions to overreactive, negative experimentation.
3. Create opportunities for demonstration projects and dis-
course, and encourage mediation and counseling engagements.
4. Formulate counterculture courses, in the traditional rhetor-
ical and academic mode, to examine and critically challenge hate-
1993]
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filled or baiting or inciting speech that so terribly affects and in-
jures people. Good speech is the best antidote for bad speech.
5. Promote incentives and disincentives that do not simulta-
neously produce disproportionately adverse side effects, such as
stigma, shunning, and speech chills.
6. Use traditional tools, skills, and mechanisms of higher edu-
cational institutions designed to protect minorities' interests in
their educational journeys.
7. Enforce existing anti-discrimination policies and laws.
8. Commit to fair affirmative activity and diversity, generating
broad opportunities for enrollment and for employment.
9. Support minority student organizations, multi-cultural
events, and the development of forums and workshops for moder-
ated discussion of controversial subjects and ideas.
The task may seem like that of Sisyphus, condemned to push
the rock up the mountain only to have it slide back on nearing the
top. His daunting daily task was a punishment; ours is a challenge.
I am confident that the views and approach I have propounded will
help our society and academia to scale and conquer the mountain
of hate speech. In any event, our positive quest should, at the very
least, prove more fruitful, in and of itself, than the oxymoronic reg-
ulatory enterprise which while designed to squelch hate speech on
campuses is doomed to failure by its self-contradiction.
[Vol. 67:1
